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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a3(2)(a) and 34A-1-303(6) of the Utah Code.
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether the Appeals Board erred when it affirmed a default judgment against
Mervyn's California ("Mervyn's"), when it is undisputed that Mervyn's intended to
dispute the charges against it and never received notice of the evidentiary hearing at
which it was found liable. No full evidentiary hearing on the merits was conducted with
Mervyn's knowledge or participation, and thus without due process accorded it. Since
the Utah Antidiscrimination and Labor Division's December 18, 2000 Order and
Determination that Mervyn's California had not Discriminated against the Petitioner,
Mervyn's California has not had an opportunity to meet the Petitioner's continuing
discrimination claims with evidence and argument.
Mervyn's California's failure to receive timely and adequate notice and the
opportunity to be heard violated its right to due process. Constitutional issues, including
that of due process, are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. See In re
K.M., 965 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The Utah Labor Commission's decision

to deny a new hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

See Osman Home

Improvement v. Industrial Commission, 958 P.2d 240,242-43 (Utah App.1998).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived oflife, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part as
follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Mervyn's appeals from a default judgment entered against it. In September of
1998, Marion App filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Utah Antidiscrimination and
Labor Division ("UALD") against Mervyn's. (R. 1) On December 18, 2000, UALD
issued an Order and Determination in favor of Mervyn's, denying agency action for Ms.
App. (R. 13-16) The UALD sent a copy of the Order and Determination to Mervyn's,
addressed to Tracy Kunkle Cote, a former Mervyn's employee. (R. 16) It is undisputed
that Mervyn's never received the UALD's Order and Determination. (R. 138, 176-77)
Ms. App decided to Appeal the UALD's decision and the matter was transferred to the
Adjudicative Division. (R. 17-18)

In February of2001, the Adjudication Division sent a Notice of Conference to
Mervyn's, again addressed to Ms. Cote informing Mervyn's of a pre-hearing conference
to be held on ~fay 24, 2001. (R. 19) In June of 2001, the Adjudication Division sent a
Notice ofFomml Hearing to Mervyn's, addressed again to Ms. Cote, informing Mervyn's
of a formal evidentiary hearing to be held on July 3, 2001. (R. 20) Mervyn's did not
receive the Notice of Conference or the Notice of Formal Hearing and, thus, did not
attend either hearing. (R. 94-95, 138, 146-47, 176-77) Because Mervyn's failed to
attend the hearing, Ms. App' s testimony stood unrefuted and Judge Richard M. La
Jeunesse entered a default judgment ("Default Order") against Mervyn's on July 18,
2001. (R. 42-50)
In August, 2001, after receiving the Default Order, Mervyn's filed a Motion for
Review seeking to set aside the Default Order and requesting a new evidentiary hearing.
(R. 51-59) In November, 2001, the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board remanded
Mervyn's request to set aside the Default Order and for a new hearing to Judge La
Jeunesse for his review. (R. 62-64) In December, 2001, Judge LaJeunesse held that
Mervyn's request to set aside the Default Order and for a new hearing did not meet the
standard of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 93-99) In January,
2002, Mervyn's filed with the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board a Motion for
Review again seeking to set aside the Default Order and requesting a new evidentiary
hearing. (R. 102-99) In June, 2002, the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board denied

Mervyn's Motion for Review. (R. 205-08) In July, 2002, Mervyn's filed a petition for
review with this court. (R. 210-11)
Statement Of Facts
On September 3, 1998, Marion App filed a Charge of Discrimination with the
UALD against Mervyn's alleging that she had been discriminated against on the basis of
a disability. (R. 1) Tracy Kunkle Cote, a Senior Team Relations Representative for
Mervyn's, promptly filed an answer refuting Ms. App's claims. (R. 2-3) During the year
of 1999, there was no communication between UALD and Mervyn's. (R. 137) In
October of 1999, while the UALD was in the midst of their investigation, Ms. Cote
resigned her employment from Mervyn's. (R. 94, 137, 152) Mervyn's received no
further contact from UALD until December 5, 2000, at which time Joan Carter, an
investigator with UALD, called and left a message with Mervyn's. (R. 137, 141) That
phone message was forwarded by Ed Smith, who had taken Ms. Cote position, to Ms.
Bonner, who had taken over management of the App matter. (R. 137, 141) Ms. Bonner
returned Ms. Carter's call and engaged in a series of conversations and exchanged
information with Ms. Carter on December 5-7, 2000. (R. 94, 137-38, 153-60).
After years of review, on December 18, 2000, UALD issued an Order and
Determination in favor of Mervyn's denying agency action for Ms. App. (R. 13-16) The
Order and Determination dismissed Ms. App's request for agency action, finding that
there was "NO REASONABLE CAUSE to believe it was more likely than not that the

Charging Party was subjected to discriminatory practices alleged." (R. 14) Although
UALD had not had contact with Ms. Cote for over two years, and had spoken with Ms.
Bonner that same month regarding the App case, UALD mailed the Order and
Determination to Ms. Cote. (R. 16, 94, 138) Mervyn's never received the UALD's
Order and Determination. (R. 138, 176-77)
On January 17, 2001, Ms. App filed a request for a formal evidentiary hearing.
(R. 17) No evidence was ever presented that either Ms. App or UALD sent Mervyn's a
copy of this request. (R. 93-99) After Ms. App filed a request for a formal evidentiary
hearing, UALD transferred Ms. App's case to the Adjudication Division. (R. 18) On
February 15, 2001, the Adjudication Division sent a Notice of Conference to Mervyn's,
again addressed to Ms. Cote, informing Mervyn's of a pre-hearing conference to be held
on May 24, 2001. (R. 19) Mervyn's did not receive the Notice of Conference. (R. 138,
176-77) Although Mervyn's had actively participated in all of the proceedings and
responded in a timely fashion to all correspondences, Mervyn's failed to attend the prehearing conference for the simple reason it did not receive the Notice of Conference. (R.
94, 138, 146-47) No one from the Adjudicative Division attempted to contact Mervyn's
to determine why they had failed to make an appearance or respond to the Notice of
Conference. (R. 93-99, 137-38)
On June .5, 2001, the Adjudication Division sent a Notice of Formal Hearing to
Mervyn's, addressed again to Ms. Cote, informing Mervyn's of a formal evidentiary

hearing to be held on July 3, 2001. (R. 20) Mervyn's did not receive the Notice of
Formal Hearing and, thus, did not attend the formal evidentiary hearing because it did not
know of it. (R. 95, 138, 146-47) No one from the Adjudicative Division attempted to
contact Mervyn's to determine why they had failed to make an appearance or respond to
the Notice of Formal Hearing. (R. 93-99, 137-38) In sworn and undisputed affidavit
testimony, Bonnie Lachina, the administrative assistant who retrieved the mail for Ed
Smith, Ms. Cote's replacement, testified that she never saw the Notice of Conference or
Notice of Formal Hearing. (R. 176) In sworn affidavit testimony, Julie Radcliffe, the
administrative assistant who retrieved mail for Ms. Bonner, who took over supervision of
the App matter, testified that she never saw the Notice of Conference or Notice of Formal
Hearing. (R. 177)
On July 18,2001, Judge LaJeunesse entered a Default Order against Mervyn's
finding that "Marion App provided the only testimony at the hearing on July 3, 2001.
Therefore Ms. App's testimony stood as the unrefuted evidence in this matter." (R. 43)
Judge LaJeunesse's Default Order ignored UALD's Order and Determination. (R. 4250) The Default Order was again mailed to Ms. Cote at Mervyn's. This time, and for the
first time, the Default Order was returned with the notation "RETURN TO SENDER NO
LONGER AT THIS ADDRESS." (R. 95) On July 27, 2001, the Adjudicative Division
removed Ms. Cote's name and the Default Order was remailed to Mervyn's and was
ultimately received by Ms. Bonner. (R. 95)

On August 10, 2001, after receiving the Default Order, Mervyn's filed a Motion
for Review seeking to set aside the Default Order and requesting a new evidentiary
hearing. (R. 51-59) Mervyn's made known in its Motion for Review that it had received
no contact regarding the App case since December 7, 2000 and reminded the Appeals
Board that, if allowed the opportunity, it could bring forth facts and documents which
support the UALD's favorable Determination and Order, and would rebut Ms. App's
claims. (R. 51-52). On November 15, 2001, the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board
remanded Mervyn's request to s<1t aside the Default Order and for a new hearing to Judge
LaJeunesse for his review. (R. 62-64)
On December 28, 2001, Judge LaJeunesse held that Mervyn's request to set aside
the Default Order and for a new hearing did not meet the standard of Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 93-99) On January 28, 2002, Mervyn's filed with the
Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board a Motion for Review again seeking to set aside
the Default Order and requesting a hearing on the merits of the case. (R. 102-99) On
June 28, 2002, the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board denied Mervyn's Motion for
Review. (R. 205-08) On July 25, 2002, Mervyn's filed a petition for review with this
court. (R. 21 0-11)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Mervyn's does not seek here a disposition of Ms. App's claims against it. It seeks
only its legal right to defend itself. This court should set aside the Default Order entered

against Mervyn's and remand to permit a new hearing under the due process clause of the
Utah Constitution. Mervyn's was not provided fair notice and the right to be heard on the
merits of the claims brought against it. Due process here requires flexible procedural
protections. In this case, Judge LaJeunesse and the Utah Labor Commission Appeals
Board failed to provide Mervyn's the procedural protections to which it is entitled, and
instead upheld the default judgment and refused to grant a new hearing based solely on
the conclusion that the notice of the evidentiary hearing was properly addressed and
mailed, and thus was "received." The Default Order was entered in violation of
Mervyn's due process rights, and this court should set it aside to permit a new hearing.
Alternatively, this court should set aside the Default Order entered against
Mervyn's and grant Mervyn's a new hearing under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Mervyn's failure to attend the formal evidentiary hearing arose from
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect," and because of a clerical error in
the UALD that failed to change Mervyn's contact person from Ms. Cote to Ms. Bonner.
Furthermore, Mervyn's has already demonstrated it is able to show it has more than a
meritorious defense to Ms. App's underlying discrimination allegations. In providing
similar relief, Utah courts have consistently held that default judgments are extreme
sanctions and are thus disfavored. Because Mervyn's can meet the appropriate standard,
Mervyn's should be given the opportunity to appear and be heard on the merits of its
case.

ARGUMENT
I.

Under The Due Process Clause Of The Utah Constitution The Default
Judgment Against Mervyn's Should Be Set Aside And Mervyn's Request For
A New Hearing Should Be Granted.
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 1 Utah Const. art. I, § 7.
"At a minimum, '[t]imely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural fairness."' In re Worthen, 926 P.2d
853, 876 (Utah 1996) (quoting Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983)).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "every person who brings a claim in a court
or at a hearing held before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive a
fair trial in front of a fair tribunal." I d. (quoting Bunnell v. Industrial Comm 'n, 740 P .2d
1331, 1333 (Utah 1987)).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "[ d]ue process is flexible and calls
for the procedural protections that the given situation demands." In re Worthen, 926 P.2d
at 876 (Utah 1996) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of
Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah 1993)); see also V-1 Oil Co. v. Department of
Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997) ("The requirements of due process
depend upon the specific context in which they are applied because unlike some legal

1

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that Utah's constitutional guarantee of due
process is substantially the same as the due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. See Untermeyer v. State Tax
Commission, 129 P.2d 881, 885 (1942).

rules due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place, and circumstances." (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Judge LaJeunesse and the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board failed to
provide the procedure protections that this situation demanded, and to provide Mervyn's
fair notice and the right to be heard on the merits of the claims asserted against it.
Instead, based solely on case law that a letter properly addressed and mailed is prima
facie evidence that it was received, Judge LaJeunesse and the Utah Labor Commission
Appeals Board ignored the actual evidence overcoming that prima facie presumption, and
denied Mervyn's request to set aside the Default Order and provide a new hearing. (R.
96-97) (citing Brown v. The Fraternal Accident Assoc. ofAmerica, 55 P. 63 (Utah 1898)
and Cooney v. McKinney, 71 P. 485 (Utah 1903)).
First of all, properly addressed and mailed letters only create a rebuttable
presumption that they were received. See Brown, 55 P. at 65. Mervyn's has more than
adequately rebutted this presumption with affidavit testimony by the office personnel
who would have received any communications from the Adjunctive Division. (R. 138)
Mervyn's has substantiated this position by sworn affidavit testimony of Bonnie Lachina,
the administrative assistant who retrieved the mail for Ed Smith, Ms. Cote's replacement,
and Julie Radcliffe, the administrative assistant who retrieved mail for Ms. Bonner, who

took over supervision of the App matter. Ms. Lachina and Ms. Radcliffe testified that
they never saw the Notice of Conference or Notice of Formal Hearing? (R. 176-77)
Another error of Judge LaJeunesse and the Utah Labor Commission Appeals
Board is their application of evidentiary concepts to what is at heart a procedural issue
involving due process. Brown and Cooney do not support the harsh remedy of a default
judgment. Brown and Cooney each address evidentiary rules concerning the importance
of receiving or not receiving a particular letter or correspondence. See Brown, 55 P. at
64-65 (issue is whether or not a letter can be used to show compliance with the terms of
an insurance policy); Cooney, 71 P. 486 (defendant objected to the introduction of a letter
into evidence because it was "incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial," but did not deny
that he had received it from the plaintiffs).
The issue here is qualitatively and legally very different. Of concern is not
whether the letter bearing upon the merits of the case was ever received. Here, the issue
is whether Mervyn's was ever properly notified that Ms. App had challenged the Order
and Determination that Mervyn's was innocent of any wrongdoing. A determination of
whether Mervyn's had notice of Ms. App's challenge should instead be more akin to a
2

As noted by Ms. App herself, "certified mail would have probably cleared up this whole
thing .... " (R. 148) There simply is no conclusive proof that Mervyn's received notice
of the hearing to deny Mervyn's its due process rights. Furthermore, a simple phone call
to Mervyn's at any time before the formal evidentiary hearing would have resolved this
situation. While Mervyn's does not contend that the Utah Labor Commission is required
to attempt to track down defendants, in this case, where Mervyn's did not attend the prehearing conference and failed for the first time to make an appearance or respond to a
correspondence, a simple phone call could have avoided this entire appeal and was

determination under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Procedure to inquire whether or not a
defendant was served with process. See Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111, 1111-13
(Utah 1955) (Proof of service is required to safeguard against default judgments.). Thus,
all safeguards to ensure notice under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were
neither met nor sought for here. This is and was a deprivation of due process.
Contrary to the implication of Judge LaJeunesse and the Utah Labor Commission
Appeals Board's ruling, at least Brown stands for the proposition that all opportunities to
present evidence should be exhausted, rather than for the proposition that simply placing
something in the mail irrevocably satisfies notice and due process requirements. In fact,
in Brown the court allowed evidence of the letter to be presented to the jury, among other
reasons, because without evidence that the letter was received by the insurance company,
plaintiffs would have been in forfeit and the Utah Supreme Court recognized that
"forfeitures are not favorable under the law." 55 P. at 64. Thus, neither of these cases
override Mervyn's due process right of notice and opportunity to present evidence and
argument on a claim brought against it. State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (quoting Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990) ("All parties are entitled to
notice that a particular issue is being considered by a court and to an opportunity to
present evidence and argument on that issue before decision")).
Because the requirements of due process have not been met in this case, this court
should set aside Judge LaJeunesse's Default Order and grant Mervyn's request for a new
certainly justified under the circumstances.

hearing on the merits.
II.

Under Rule 60(b) Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure The Default
Judgment Against Mervyn's Should Be Set Aside And Mervyn's Request For
A New Hearing Should Be Granted.
As recognized by Judge LaJeunesse, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure allows relief for a party from a default judgment, order or decree if certain
grounds are established. (R. 96) Some of those grounds are that the judgment was
obtained by reason of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect," or "any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(l) & (6). In addition, to prevail under Rule 60(b), a party must show that it has a
meritorious defense in the case. See, e.g., State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56
(Utah 1983). Mervyn's satisfied each of these elements.
This court should vacate the Default Order entered against Mervyn's, and
Mervyn's should be granted a hearing because its failure to attend the formal evidentiary
hearing is based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." Furthermore,
Mervyn's has more than a meritorious defense to Ms. App's underlying discrimination
allegations. In providing relief under Rule 60(b ), Utah courts have consistently held that
default judgments are extreme sanctions that should be meted out with caution and that
the courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, should strive to permit a full and
complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case. See Wright v. Wright,
941 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah 1997).

GARDNEJD\SLC\217104 1

The tribunals below ignored or rejected this tenet.

A.

Mervyns' Failure to Attend the Formal Evidentiary Hearing was
Based on Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise or Excusable Neglect.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that "on motion and upon such terms
as are just, the Court may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect ... or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Utah Supreme Court has
noted that "[t]he court should be generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside
where there is reasonable justification or excuse." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah
1986) (emphasis added). Mervyn's can provide more than a reasonable excuse for its
failure to attend the formal evidentiary hearing that resulted in Judge LaJeunesse's
Default Order. It never knew of it.
As detailed in the facts section above, Ms. App originally filed a Charge of
Discrimination in this case on September 3, 1998. (R. 1) Ms. Cote, a Senior Team
Relations Representative for Mervyn's, filed Mervyn's original answer. (R. 2-3) Ms.
Cote never made a formal appearance as Mervyn's appointed representative, although
from this point on all correspondences were directed to Ms. Cote. During the year of
1999, there was no communication between UALD and Mervyn's. (R. 137) In October,
1999, Ms. Cote left Mervyn's employment. (R. 137, 152) Over one year later, on
December 5, 2000, Joan Carter, an investigator from the UALD called Mervyn's. (R.
137, 141) Ed Smith, Ms. Cote's replacement, forwarded Ms. Carter's voice mail to Ms.
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Bonner, who had taken over management of the App matter. (R. 137, 141) Ms. Bonner
proceeded to return Ms. Carter's call and engaged in a series of conversations with Ms.
Carter from December 5 to December 7, 2000. (R. 94, 137-38, 153-60) While Ms.
Bonner did not enter a formal appearance, for all intents and purposes it was made clear
to the UALD that she was now handling the App matter. Indeed, she was the UALD's
only contact at Mervyn's.
Subsequent to Ms. Bonner's conversations with Ms. Cater, Mervyn's had no
further contact from the UALD or the Adjudicative Division until notice of the Default
Order was finally mailed, simply, to "Mervyn's," rather than to an employee who had left
years before. (R. 95) People change jobs, and mail is sometimes misdirected. The
circumstances provide a very reasonable explanation for Mervyn's failure to receive
notice of the hearings, and are a far cry from cases in which courts have found that a
party's failure to be diligent means the particular default judgment is justified. See, e.g.,

Utah Dep't ofTrans. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4 (1995) (refusing to set aside default
judgment because defendant failed to respond to discovery requests and resulting motion
to compel for more than eighteen months); Russell v. Martell, 681 P .2d 1193, 1194 (Utah
1984) (refusing to set aside default judgment because defendant stated "that he felt no
legal obligation to [plaintiff] and did not feel motivated by the lawsuit to address
[plaintiffs] claims"). These knowing defaults contrast greatly to Mervyn's unknowing
failure to attend a hearing.

Default is a harsh remedy and courts should be liberal in granting relief against
default judgments so that cases may be tried on the merits. See Erickson v. Schenkers
Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994). Indeed, "the very reason for

the existence of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice
between them." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544
P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). The Utah Supreme Court has held that "courts generally tend
to favor granting relief from default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse,
unless it will result in substantial prejudice or injustice to the adverse party."
Westinghouse,_ 544 P.2d at 879 (emphasis added). Mervyn's has presented more than a

reasonable excuse, and Ms. App cannot legitimately claim that she will be prejudiced by
this Appeals Boards' granting a rehearing to address this case on the merits. The result of
granting Mervyn's the relief it seeks here will be Ms. App getting her day in court, along
with Mervyn's.

B.

Mervyn's has a Meritorious Defense that it Should be Allowed to
Present.

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "[i]n order for defendant to be
relieved from the default judgment, he must not only show that the judgment was entered
against him through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in Rule 60(b) ), but
he must also show ... that he has a meritorious defense to the action." Musselman, 667
P.2d at 1055-56. "A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set
aside if it is entitled to be tried." Erickson, 882 P.2d at 1149. Thus, "[o]ne who seeks to

vacate a default judgment must proffer some defense of at least sufficient ostensible merit
as would justify a trial of the issue thus raised." !d. (citation omitted). Mervyn's easily
satisfies, and satisfied, this standard.
In July 1998, Ms. App was informed that she was being transferred from the Guest
Services Depatiment to the Kids' Department in order to meet a business need and have
one less employee receiving benefits in the Guest Services Department, and more
employees receiving benefits on the sales floor. (R. 3) At that time, Ms. App informed
Mervyn's of her alleged disability and presented a doctor's note which advised her
against "prolonged walking" and another that noted her vision problems. (R. 3) To
accommodate Ms. App's alleged disabilities, Mervyn's gave Ms. App the option of
working in the Jewelry Department. (R. 4) Ms. App declined this accommodation. (R.
4) In her Charge of Discrimination, filed on September 3, 1998, Ms. App claimed
discrimination based on disability. (R. 1)
After over two years of investigation, on December 18, 2000, UALD issued an
Order and Determination that dismissed Ms. App's request for agency action, finding that
there was "NO REASONABLE CAUSE to believe it was more likely than not that the
Charging Party was subjected to discriminatory practices alleged." (R. 13) The Order
and Determination specifically rejected Ms. App's claim that her reduced vision was an
actionable disability because "[Ms. App] acknowledge[ d] that at the time of this action,
she was able to see with glasses .... [Ms. App's] use of mitigating measures (glasses)

rendered her vision impairment non-substantially limiting when compared to a person in
the general population." (R. 14)
While the Order and Determination recognized that "there were no mitigating
measures used by [Ms. App] with regards to the neuropathy .... [Mervyn's] did offer
[Ms. App] reasonable accommodations of working in the fine jewelry department which
is a small department. Further, [Mervyn's] offered a stool for [Ms. App.] to sit on as well
as a magnify [sic] glass in case she needed it. [Ms. App] acknowledged that she refused
the reasonable accommodation" (R. 14) The UALD held that Ms. App's "transfer to the
Kid's Department was not a demotion because there was no loss in pay, hours or status.
Further, there is no causal link between [Ms. App's] transfer and [Ms. App] being an
individual with a disability." (R. 14)
Mervyn's has a meritorious defense to Ms. App's charge of discrimination. Judge
LaJeunesse did not entertain or consider Mervyn's meritorious defense when he entered
a default judgment against Mervyn's. (R. 43) (finding that "Marion App provided the
only testimony at the hearing on July 3, 2001. Therefore Ms. App's testimony stood as
the unrefuted evidence in this matter"). This was contrary to law. "The courts, in the
interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for
a hearing on the merits of every case." Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60,
62, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (1962) (footnote omitted); see also Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d
601, 603 (Utah 1976). It is well established that default judgments are not favored, and
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that courts "should be generally indulgent toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge
of disputes so that they can be settled advisedly and in conformity with law and justice."

E.J Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951, 951 (Utah 1962). All Mervyn's is
seeking is simple justice- to have the opportunity to present its defense to Ms. App's
claims and to receive a decision that is based upon the merits of this case.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed herein, Mervyn's requests that this court set aside the
default judgment entered against Mervyn's and remand for a new evidentiary hearing on
all factual issues arising in this matter.
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